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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
OGDEN CITY, a :Municipal Corporation, 
Plaint.iff, 
-vs.-
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, a body politic and MOUNTAIN 
ST.A.TE'S TELEPHONE AND TELE-
GRAPH CO:JIP ANY, a corporation, 
Defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action by Ogden City to obtain a review 
of an order of the defendant Public Service Commission 
authorizing the defendant Mountain States Telephon(? 
and Telegraph Company (hereinafter sometimes called 
the "Company") to make effective its "Second Revised 
Sheet 5 of its Utah Intrastate General Exchange Tariff, 
Section 20, 'General Regulations,' '' filed with the Com-
mission under date of December 19, 1951. (Record 34). 
That order was granted upon the application (R 1-3) 
of the Company and over the protest (R. 136-139; 38-45) 
of the City. 
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The so-called "Tariff" which was thus approved by 
the Commission, so far as pertinent, reads as follows: 
"1. Rate schedules of the Telephone Com-
pany, in Utah, do not include any portion of any 
sales, excise, franchise, or occupation tax, costs 
of furnishing service without charge, or similar 
taxes or impositions presently or that may here-
after be levied by the F'ederal Government, the 
State of Utah, or any political subdivision or tax-
ing authority. 
"2. Insofar as practicable, any such taxes, 
levies impositions or charges presently or here-
hereafter levied may be billed by the Company 
to its exchange customers on a prorata basis, with 
the amount thereof added to the bill for service 
to the Company's subscribers in the area wherein 
such taxes, impositions or other charges are or 
shall be levied against the Telephone Company." 
(R. 3 and 25). 
For a clear understanding of the situation it is neces-
sary at this point toturn back to the time when the Com-
pany's franchise to use the City's streets was negotiated 
and granted, and to consider some other facts in the 
background. 
The franchise in question was negotiated and grant-
ed in 1941 to run for a period of 25 years, or until1966. 
(R. 125-127; Exhibits 3 and 4, R. 21 and 22, admitted R. 
152-3). It must be presumed that this franchise contract 
was submitted to and approved by the Commission before 
it was accepted and executed by the Company as pro-
vided in Section 8 of the franchise ordinance, as re-
quired by Section 76-4-24 (2) U.C.A. 
2 
-, 
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By that franchise the City granted the Con1pany 
the right to use its streets for pole lines, cables, etc. 
In consideration thereof the Company agreed to pay the 
City annually an amount equal to 1% of the local ex-
change revenues derived from telephones in Ogden City 
and to provide the City certain so-called "free service" 
during the term of the franchise. (Ibid., and R. 125-6). 
In those negotiations it was understood by the Com-
pany's representative that the City Commissioners who 
represented the City acted in a representative capacity 
for the citizens and inhabitants of Ogden, so that the 
inhabitants were in effect the real parties in interest. (R. 
127). 
The Company's representative (R. 125) recognized 
that the franchise tax (or fee) is imposed upon the Com-
pany and not directly upon its customers (as in the case 
of excise and sales taxes) although the money to pay all 
taxes and other obligations must in the last analysis be 
found in the ·consideration paid for services furnished 
by the Company. (R. 127-129). 
Until the present time all municipal franchise fees 
and taxes always have been absorbed in the general ex-
pense of the Company. (R. 1; 100; 110; 118; 140; 26). 
They were, with the exception of an increase in the 
Salt Lake City tax, included in the oveerall expenses of 
the Company in the fixing of the presently existing 
rates of the Company in the Commission's case No. 
3596, in which the Order was issued on August 10, 1951. 
(R. 100; 110; 26; 118). 
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A number of the cities and towns in the state have 
imposed or exacted sales taxes, excise taxes, franchise 
fees, occupational taxes and/ or free services from the 
Company. (R. 110-115; Exhibit 2). The Company, or at 
least its Utah Manager, Mr. 'Sawyer, regards all these 
taxes and free services as essentially the same (R. 109), 
a legal position with which the City cannot agree. 
Except in the case of the franchise fee paid and free 
services rendered Ogden City for the use of its streets, 
the nature of these taxes was never specified, and the 
Record is silent as to whether or not the sums paid other 
municipalities were franchise fees in the nature of rental 
for the special use and occupation of City streets (as in 
Ogden's case) or occupational or license taxes imposed on 
the Company's and other businesses or on the Company's 
business alone for purely revenue purposes, or were sales 
taxes on the sale of the Company's services, or excise 
taxes imposed on some other phase of the Company's 
business activities. 
At any rate the amount of the taxes, and the per-
centage which the amount bears to the gross revenues of 
the Company varies from city to city. Currently the 
Ogden franchise fee is 1% plus free services amounting, 
on the basis of current revenues, to .44 of 1% of the gross 
receipts from local exchange revenues derived from tele-
phones within the city limits. (R. 115, Exhibit 2; 125). 
The transfer of the burden of all these charges and 
free services to, and the recovery of the amount of the 
tax and the retail value of the free services from local 
consumers within the municipalities involved will result 
in an increase in the Company's net earnings from 5.26% 
to 5.4 7% of capital invested, or an increase of .21% of 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
net earnings after taxes. (R. 118-119). 
The exi~ting telephone rate schedules group towns 
by size, according to the number of telephones on the 
exchange, and a rate is fixed for telephones in each group, 
upon the assmnption that the value of a telephone to a 
subscriber varies directly with the nwnber of phones 
which can be reached therefron1 without toll charge. (R. 
129-130). However, it is noteworthy in this case that 
geographically the boundaries of the urban base rate, or 
"city ser·rice" area does not follow the city limits; there 
are subscribers outside the city limits who get urban 
service and pay the regular urban charge, without any 
premium. 
Moreover, neither the applicant Compa;ny nor OJnJY-
one else presented any evidence whatsoever proving or 
tending to prove that the rates, based on the historical 
practice approved in the general rate case just last year, 
were in any way "unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or 
preferential, or in anywise in violation of any provisions 
of law" as is required by Section 76-4-4, U.CA. before the 
Commission may act. On the contrary, the Company's 
only witness testified on cross examination that he "could 
not say" as to whether or not the rural lines "pay their 
way" upon the rates in an equal proportion to the city 
or base rate areas, that the Company did not attempt 
to define its operations that fine on an exchange, but 
develops an over-all cost to furnish service in a particu-
lar exchange area, and does not break down the cost of 
furnishing service in the rural as cornpared to the city. 
(R. 134-135). 
Again (R. 1±3), the witness Mr. Sawyer testified 
that it might be true that in a given exchange that the 
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Company actually has to operate at a loss ; that the Com-
pany doesn't attempt to define areas around the state or 
within exchanges where the cost of operation might be 
in excess of the rates. 
And again, he testified that he had no figures to 
submit as to what proportion of the earnings come from 
the several exchanges, or whether they are bearilng their 
fair share in the overall picture. (R. 149-150; Emphasis 
added). 
It is, of course, admitted that in the Ogden area (as 
an example) every phone call from the rural area, and 
from the urban base area outside the city limits must 
travel through the Ogden Exchange and along the city 
streets pursuant to the franchise granted by the City. To 
that extent every subscriber from outside the city limits 
uses and directly benefits from the franchise. On the 
other hand not every call from a city phone travels over 
a country road; calls between city subscribers travel 
only over city streets, and there is no automatic com-
pensating use of country roads. (R. 133). This obvious 
discrimination is enhanced by the fact that the city tax-
payer pays ad valorem taxes to maintain the country 
roads. . 
The existing discrimination, if any, is against the 
city and in favor of the rural subscriber, instead of vioe 
versa, as was assumed by the Company and the Com-
mission. 
Although the counties of the State (except Washing-
ton County) are all furnished similar free services, no 
proposal or order was made to bill the cost of these to the 
telephone users in the several areas involved. (R. 121; 
25; 34). 
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Upon the filing of the Company's application, the 
Commission, pursuant to Section 76-6-12 (1), U.C.A., sus-
pended the operation of the proposed Second Revised 
Sheet 5, and entered upon an investigation of the matter 
without formal pleadings, and held the hearing at which 
the evidence disclosed the facts as above outlined. 
Upon the closing of the hearing the Commission 
made its Report, Findings and Order approving the pro-
posed recovery of all franchise fees and license taxes, 
so far as practicable, from subscribers within the respec-
tive municipalities. (R. 24-37). It apparently found as 
a fact in substance that the present practice of treating 
the franchise fees and license taxes as a general expense 
of the Company resulted in "some discrimination" against 
non-city subscribers in the applicable rates and charges 
for telephone service, and that the practice should be 
discontinued. (R. 28-29; 31). It also found that customers 
living outside the cities contribute a part of the cost of 
these taxes and impositions, while receiving little or no 
direct benefit therefrom. (R. 29). 
The Commission further found that the City's con-
tention that its franchise contract was entered into with 
the intent that the funds to pay the city for the rights 
acquired by the Company would come from the general 
income of the Company is not supported by the evidence, 
and that the application of the proposed tariff would not 
affect the City's constitutional rights, or impair its con-
tracts. ( R 33) 
A petition for rehearing was filed with the Commis-
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sian, setting out in detail the points to be hereinafter 
argued. The petition was denied, and the City thereupon 
brought this action to obtain a review of the Commis-
sion's proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The Commission unlawfully imposed upon the 
protesting city, rather than upon the applicant com-
pany, the burden of proof in the preceeding below. 
2. There is no evidence to support the findings of 
the Commission to the effect that the present practice 
of treating the franchise fees as a general expense of 
the company results in some discrimination against non-
city subscribers in the applicable rates and charges for 
telephone service. 
3. There is no evidence to support the finding of 
the Commission to the effect that the Company's cus-
tomers outside the cities (including Ogden City) con-
tribute a part of the franchise fees and the special taxes, 
while receiving little or no direct benefit therefrom. 
4. The finding of the Commission, to the effect 
that there is no evidence that the City's franchise contract 
was entered into with the intent that the funds to pay 
the city for the rights thereby acquired by the Company 
would come from the general income of the Company, 
is contrary to all of the competent evidence in the pro-
ceeding, and contrary to law. 
5. The Order of the Commission impairs the obliga-
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tion of the Company's franchise contract with the City 
and its inhabitants in violation of Article I, Section 10, 
Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United 'States, and of 
Article I, Section 18 of the Constitution of Utah. 
6. The Order of the Commission, by authorizing 
a specific and arbitrary set off, releases and extinguishes, 
at least in part, the indebtedness, liability, and obliga-
tion of the Company to the City under its franchise con-
tract, in violation of Article VI, Sections 27 and 29, of 
the Constitution of Utah. 
7. The Order of the Commission is void and be-
yond the powers of the Commission granted by the legis-
lature, and is a void attempt to exercise power to super-
vise and interfere with municipal money and property 
and to levy municipal taxes and perform municipal func-
tions, which powers the legislature cannot validly grant 
the Commission under Article VI, Section 29 and Article 
XII, Section 8, of the Constitution of Utah. 
8. The Order of the Commission by its terms and 
in effect unlawfully transforms a lawful and proper 
franchise fee exacted from the Company into an unlawful 
sales, purchase or use tax on the user of telephone serv-
ice, in violation of Article VI, Section 29, Article XI, 
Section 5(a), and Article XIII, Section 5, of the Consti-
tution of Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. The Commission wnlawfully imposed up-
on the protesting city, rather than upon the applicarnt 
company, the burden of proof in the proceeding below. 
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It is conceded that the proposal to charge the fran-
chise fees to the telephone using inhabitants of the cities 
involved will result in an increase in cost of telephone 
service to the inhabitants, and an increase in net income 
to the Company. Under these circumstances and under 
the provisions of Section 76-6-12{1), U.C.A., 1943, pur-
suant to which the proceeding was held (R. 4), the alter-
ation in the established practice cannot be made "except 
upon a showing before the Commission and a finding 
by the Commission that such increase is justified." 
Furthermore, under the provisions of Section 76-4-
4(1), U.C.A., 1943, relating to the powers of the Commis-
sion to regulate rates, regulations, practices, etc., of 
utilities, the Commission has no power to order or au-
thorize a change in a rate or practice unless substantial 
evidence is first presented to prove, and the Commission 
finds, that the existing rates or practices are inherently 
"unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or preferential," 
or in some way in violation of some law. 
In the case of 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph 
Company vs. Public Service Commission 
105 Utah 230, 142 Pac. 2nd 873; Rehear-
ing denied 105 Utah 266, 271; 145 Pac. 
2nd 790, 792, 
this court held that an order requiring intrastate rates 
to be reduced to the level of intrastate rates is invalid 
unless based on evidence "calculated to show that exist-
ing intrastate rates were inherently unreasonable." Ob-
viously there is no presumption that existing rates or 
10 
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practices are unreasonable; the proponents of a proposed 
change nn1st prove that as a fad. In the absence of such 
evidence there i::; obviously a presun1ption that existing 
practices are reasonable and non-discriminatory. This is 
especially true where, as here, the Commission, on Aug-
ust 10, 1951, less than seven (7) 1nonths before, had found 
and determined in its case No. 3596, that the existing 
practices were fair and reasonable, as required by law. 
(R. 26). 
This is the rule elsewhere. In the case of 
Birmingham Electric vs. Alabama Public 
Service Commission, 4 7 So. 2d 455, (Ala.) 
it was held that in a statutory proceeding wherein the 
utility attempts to designate an increased rate which be-
comes effective unless suspended by the Commission, the 
burden of establishing the basis for the increase is on the 
utility. 
And in 
Tulsa Tribune Company vs. Oklahoma Na-
tural Gas Company, 261 Pac. 213 ( Okl.) 
the court held that the burden rests on one seeking to es-
tablish special rates to show that the rates set by the 
Corporation Commission are unjust and unreasonable. 
See also 
and 
Atlantic City Sewerage vs. Board of Public 
Utility Commissioners, 26 A. 2d 71, aff'd. 
29 A. 2nd 850 (N.J.L.) 
New York Edison Company vs. Maltbie, 279 
N.Y.S.. 949. 
In this case the burden of proof was on the company 
11 
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to establish (1) that the existing practice of including 
franchise fees in the Company's over-all costs was un-
reasonable, unjust and discriminatory, and to establish 
(2) that the proposed change would correct that discrim-
ination. 
Both the Company and the Commission assumed, 
without any evidence to support them, that both of these 
facts were true in February, although not true in the 
preceding August. The Commission argued in its "Re-
port and Findings" (R. 28-29) that "Because of the Na-
ture of these license, occupation, and franchise taxes and 
the manner in which the Company has spread the ex-
pense. . . . to all of the telephone users of the state, it 
becomes apparent that some discrimination results ... " 
(Emphasis added.) However, as disclosed by the Record, 
surrunarized in the Statement of Facts, and hereinafter 
more fully discussed, there was nothing presented to 
show the extent of such discrimination, or whether such 
discrimination was, in the over-all picture, against or in 
favor of the inhabitants of Ogden City or of any other 
municipality. The Company's witness just had no figures 
to present. There was presented absolutely no basis 
for compa.rison. 
The making of the order in favor of the proponent 
Company under these circumstances is obviously tanta-
mount to presuming the existence of these basic facts and 
placing the burden on the protestant city to disprove their 
existence. This, as has been shown, is contrary to law. 
The position erroneously, and perhaps unconscious-
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adJuitted that the corporation and its officers in this case 
acted for and represented its inhabitants who are the 
real parties in interest, and under the American rule, 
the third party beneficiary is recognized as the legal 
obligee. Second, no n1atter who is recognized as the 
obligee, the obligation of the Company is impaired. The 
City is entitled to look to its original obligor, and cannot 
be compelled to accept a novation with new obligors who 
will, as the Commission anticipates, immediately bring 
pressure and agitate for the cancellation of the obliga-
tion. Third, it is the established law of this state, and 
elsewhere, that "a corporate entity may be entirely dis-
regarded in order to reach and protect the real parties 
in interest, and to disclose the real transaction." 
See also 
Western Securities Co. v. Spiro, 62 Utah 
623, 221 Pac. 856, Syllabus 5. 
18 C.J.S. "Corporations," section 6, pp. 376-
377, 
where it is said that: 
"It is clear that a corporation is in fact a 
collection of individuals, and that the idea of the 
corporation as a legal entity or person apart from 
its members is a mere fiction of the law intro-
duced for convenience in conducting the business 
in this privileged way. It is now well settled, as 
a general doctrine, that, when this fiction is urged 
to an intent not within its reason and purpose, 
it should be disregarded and the corporation con-
sidered as an aggregation of persons, both in 
equity and at law .... The courts will disregard 
the corporate fiction whenever its retention would 
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produce injustices and inequitable consequence~-" 
See also 
62 C.J.S., pp. 68-69, 
where it is said 'that a municipal corporation may, and 
frequently does act as agent for its citizens, and is re-
garded as a trustee for its inhabitants. 
If ever there was a case where the corporate entity 
should be disregarded in the interests of justice, this is 
that case. The inhabitants of Ogden stand in grave dan-
ger of being unjustly deprived of the fruits of their grant 
of franchise privileges by the subterfuge of paying 
through their corporation, with their money, a debt bene-
ficially owned by them. The corporate entity of their 
municipal corporation must not be permitted to stand 
between them and justice. 
The Company's obligation to the City's inhabitants 
is impaired by the Commission's order. 
As to the second objection raised by the Company 
to this point, we readily concede that it is a general rule 
that Municipal Corporations cannot claim, as against the 
state, the protection of the "impairment of obligations" 
clauses. There are two clear replies by way of which 
the City avoids this admitted rule. 
The first has already been suggested. The real 
parties in interest here are the individual telephone-using 
inhabitants of Ogden, in whose behalf the City here ap-
pears. They are under no such disability, and it seems 
possible, from the clamor here, that the members of the 
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ly, taken by the Commi~sion on this question of burden 
of proof i~ well indicated by its statement in its Report 
and Findings (R.30) that "The protestant, Ogden City, 
sought. among other things, to show that there is dis-
crimination in rate~ c.onstn1ced on a state-wide basis . 
. . . " (Emphasis added.) On the contrary, Ogden City 
did not seek to show, or asswne the burden of showing 
anything. It sought only to require the Company to as-
sume its proper legal burden of showing that present 
state-wide rates are unreasonable and discriminatory 
as claimed by the Company and that, as further claimed 
by the Company, its proposed new tariff would cure 
the same. 
This case IS in principle identical with Mowntain 
States Telephone and Telegraph Company vs. Public 
Service Commission, supra. There the Commission, with-
out supporting evidence, preswned that "there was no 
reasonable basis for any difference" between interstate 
and intrastate rates. This court struck down the order 
based on that preswnption. In this case the Commission, 
without supporting evidence, preswned, 
(1) that the Company's payment of the various 
municipal occupation taxes and franchise fees 
creates a difference in the burden of telephone 
rates; 
(2) that such difference discriminates against the 
rate-payer outside the municipalities in ques-
tion; 
( 3) that the difference and discrimination is exactly 
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equal to the amount of the tax; and 
( 4) that there is no reasonable basis for the pre-
sumed difference, 
thus piling one unjustified presumption on another. The 
order based on these presumptions also should be struck 
down. 
As we will demonstrate below, there is no evidence 
whatsoever in the record to support any one of these 
bold assumptions made by the applicant Company and 
the acquiescent Commission. 
The indulging of this presumption in effect places 
the burden on the City to disprove a fact which the Com-
pany had the burden of proving. This is contrary to law. 
The Commission's order should be vacated because of 
this vital legal error. 
It should perhaps be added here that, while the Com-
mission's findings are so informally phrased and so ar-
gumentative that it is difficult to ascertain therefrom 
just what facts are found, it seems apparent that the 
Commission has nowhere attempted to find that the dis-
crimination it presumed to exist is without reasonable 
basis. If so, then there is no finding (with or without evi-
dence) to support the order, as is required by law and 
the decision of this court abo;ve cited, and the order 
cannot stand. 
POINT 2. There is no evidence to support the find-
ings of the Commission to· the effect that the presoot 
practice of treating the franchise fe.es as a general ex-
14 
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pense of the company results in some discrimination 
against non-city subscribers in the applicable rates arnd 
charges for telephone service. 
Throughout the hearing before the Commission the 
Company and its sole witness apparently assumed that 
the payment of varying franchise fees, as well as the 
payment of other taxes mentioned, as general expenses 
of the Company resulted in discrimination against the 
users of telephones outside the limits of the cities who 
are paid for the use of their public streets in the Com-
pany's private business, or for the privilege of doing 
business therein. The Commission, obviously anxious 
to approve the application, which had apparently been 
made at the instigation of one or more members of the 
Commission (R.101), fell into the s·ame error. 
But there is no evidence in the record to p·rove that 
assumption as a fact. 
There are only two ways in which the Company 
could have proved such discrimination, or proved, as 
required by law, that existing rates and practices are 
"unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or preferential:" 
(1) It could produce evidence to show that the 
Commission erred in its order of August 10, 
1951, approving the existing rate structure, 
including the practice of absorbing the fees 
and taxes in question in its total operation, 
as general expenses; or 
(2) It could prove a change in circumstances oc-
curring since the previous hearing which for 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the first time rendered the existing practice 
unjust, unreasonable discriminatory or prefer-
ential. 
The Company of course was foreclosed by the doc-
trine of res adjudicata from a collateral attack here on the 
Commission's 1951 General Rate Order, and hence it 
could not legally follow the first ·alternative. It did not 
attempt to do so, but, on the contrary it conceded, in 
effect, that until recently the established practice of treat-
ing these taxes as general operating expense had an in-
signific~nt effect. See Counsel's opening statement (R. 
100), and the testimony of the sole witness (R. 116-7). 
The Company therefore attempted the second 
method, and produced evidence of a recent increase (from 
1% to 2%) in the tax or fee paid to Salt Lake City, plus 
testimony that the Company was "informed" that several 
cities were considering proposals which, "if adopted," 
would further increase these expenses. Finally, the Com-
pany's Exhibit 2 (R. 17-20) showed that the amount 
of these "special taxes" ·as the Company chooses to call 
them, varies from nothing in a number of small cities to 
.39% of local 0xchange gross receipts in Midvale, to 
1.44% in Ogden, to 2% in Salt Lake City, and to an 
isolated and insignificant high of 7.28% in tiny Scho-
field. That was all. (R. 117; 125; 140-141). One curious 
thing about the Company's position on this point is that 
according to counsel's opening statement (which he 
read from a p"'.'epared script) the Company in 1951 paid 
$149,000 in occupation taxes, franchise fees, free service, 
etc. (R. 100), but notwithstanding the increase referred 
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to the estimate for 1952 was only $1~-!,623. (Exhibit 2, 
R. 17: R. 111 and 115). The fig11res don't show the 
increase the Company claimed. 
However that nmy be, this evidence certainly does 
not prove that existing rates produce any unl'awful or 
unreasonable discrin1ination against non-taxing or non-
franchise communities. 
Let us consider the various assumptions in which the 
defendants in this case (the proponents below) indulged 
themseh·es in the proceeding under review. 
First, it was assumed that payment of the fees, taxes, 
etc., out of the general funds of the Company creates a 
difference in the burden of telephone rates. But there is 
absolutely no proof as to what these rates are, either 
in or out of the communities involved, except that the 
rates vary from community to community, the vari·ation 
being by groups, according to the number of telephones 
in the exchange. (R 129). These rates were established, 
after hearing, on .August 10, 1951, and all city franchise 
fees and license taxes then existing were considered at 
that time. (R. 125). These included the Ogden City 1% 
franchise fee and its "free service" rendered as street 
rental. These ~ncluded all such charges now existing 
except half of Salt Lake City's present 2% charge. .As 
the Commission is presumed in law to do its legal duty 
(at least until the contrary is shown) it must be pre-
sumed that the rate schedules so fixed did not impose 
an unfair and discriminatory burden on rate payers 
outside of Ogden, Logan, Provo and other franchise 
or taxing cities, even though these charges were in-
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eluded arnd ha;n,dled as a general expense. 
There is absolutely no evidence to show that these 
rates did not in fact, with due allowance for the type 
of service rendered, distribute the burden equally among 
all rate payers, not only for variations in these charges, 
but also for variations in labor costs, in office rentals, 
in local levies of ad valorem taxes, and in the c·ost of 
transporting equipment to serve the communities, and 
so on through all the multitudinous cost factors of a 
telephone serv!ce. 
Of course, it would not only strain, but would rup-
ture credulity for us to ask the court to believe that every 
phone user in the state now bears exactly his fair share 
of the Company's various costs, and we do not do so. 
On the contrary, we believe that susbtantial inequalities 
exist, but that in fact they discriminate against, rather 
than in favor of the rate payers in Ogden City and, in 
gener'al, in her sister municipalities who have franchise 
agreements with, or levy occupational taxes on, the Com-
pany. 
Our point is that the burden is on the Company to 
prove the claimed difference in burden as a basis for its 
proposed change in pr~actice and charge,s, and there is no 
evidence in the record either as to the actual or compara-
tive rates paid by, or the cost burden and capital invest-
ment properly to be alloeated to, the customers in and! 
out of the communities involved. Until there is pre-
pared a study showing separately for each area involved 
the amount of capital investment and the ~amount of op-
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eration costs fairly to be allocated to each area, on the 
one hand, and the amount of revenue derived from each 
area, on the other hand, there is no possible basis for 
comparison, or for judging- which, if any, are bearing 
an unjust share of the burden to the benefit of another. 
Second, it was assumed that the (assumed) differ-
ence in burden discriminates against the rate payer 
outside the municipalities in question. Here again there 
is a complete absence of evidence to support the assump-
tion; indeed, when considered in the light of matters 
of general knowledge, and of which the court will take 
judicial knowledge, the only evidence available all tends 
to prove that presently it is the telephone users in Ogdoo 
and her sister cities who suffer from discrimilnation iJn 
phone rates. 
Let us consider the evidence before the Commission. 
The existing rates classify the exchanges according 
to the number of telephones served, and uniform rates 
are established for all the towns within each group 
or class. The rates vary from group to group. Within 
each group the rates vary with the class of service, 
whether urban-commercial or urban-residential 1, 2 or 
4 party line, or rural multi-party line servi·ce. (R. 129-
130). Furthermore, some subscribers outside the city 
limits, but apparently close thereto, get urbarn service 
at urban rates. (R. 130-131). 
There is no evidence as to the actual classification 
or the actual rates, or the variation therein as between 
the franchise-granting or taxing municipalities ·and the 
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rest of the state. 
Nor is there any direct evidence to show the rela-
tive cost of serving the taxing as against the non-taxing 
areas. Indeed, although the Company's case when pre-
sented showed an ultimate care in preparation (questions 
and answers on direct examination were read from mim-
eographed sheets) the Company's m·anager on cross 
examination was asked, "And, as I understand it, you 
have no figures to show and here submit as to what 
proportion of your earnings come from each of these 
towns and whether they are bearimg their fair share 
of the overall picture.re" He answered, "No, I don't have 
a figure developed on each exchange of that type." (R. 
149-150). 
Moreover, he further testified that he "could not say" 
whether the rural lines "pay their way" in equal pro-
portion to the city base rate areas, as the Company 
doesn't attempt to define its operations that fine, but 
only develops overall costs. (R. 134-135). And he admit-
ted (R. 143) that it might be true that in a given exchange 
the Company operates at a loss, although the Company 
doesn't "attempt to define" areas in the state where 
costs might be in excess of expense of operation. It 
does "maintain records on the total cost of operation 
within the state and make rates to take care of those 
expenses." (Ibid.) 
The Company's manager further admitted that cost 
of service varied with the distance from the exchange: 
* it is cheaper for us to furnish service to a man 
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a block away than it is a 1nile away." The admission that 
costs vary directly with distance from the exchange is 
implicit in the extra rharge for urban service to a sub-
scriber loeated outside the urban base rate area. (R.131). 
This, of course, is obvious, so obvious that the Court 
would, we believe, take judicial notice thereof even in 
the absence of this admission. Probably this circum-
stance is the reason the Company does not do any cost 
accounting on an area basis: such accounting would 
disclose that the urban areas are "carrying" the rural 
areas and the areas in which new development is taking 
place. 
If rates were made on an area basis, instead of 
state-wide, these urban areas would certainly be in a 
better bargaining position, and doubtless would refuse 
to "carry" the others, which would make it more difficult 
to extend the system into new and more sparsely popu-
lated areas. Doubtless this is the basis of Mr. Sawyer's 
comment (R. 145) that it wouldn't be to the interest of 
"all" the users of service "to attempt to break down 
rates that fine." 
Perhaps we should pause here to say that the City 
does not here object to the principle of fixing rates on 
a state-wide basis-what it objects to is the departure 
therefrom with respect to franchise fees and taxes, espe-
cially in the absence of any evidence to show any reason-
able basis in fact for that departure from established 
and approved practice. 
Let us now turn to the documentary evidence which 
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was introduced, Exhibit 2. (R. 17-20). 
A glance at sheet 2 thereof (R. 18) discloses that 
the municipalities receiving franchise fees or occupa-
tional tax include substantially all of the state's larger 
and more densely populated cities lying within the state's 
central valley, in which, as the court judicially knows, 
there are concentrated the great bulk of our population 
and of our industrial and comme.rcial activity. Salt 
Lake City, Ogden, Provo, Logan, Murray, Farmington, 
Brigham City, Price, Bountiful, Vernal, Spanish Fork, 
Richfield and St. George all fall in this group. In all 
of them the bulk of the subscribers obviously will live 
near the central exchanges where the unit cost of equal 
service will be lowest-how much lower the applicant 
Company was not interested in saying, nor the com-
plaisant Commission in hearing. But under present rate 
policies these communities are the very ones where the 
subscriber now pays the highest rates, because he has 
available at his local exchange a larger number of tele-
phones which he can call, without toll charge, (whether 
or not he will have any occasion to do so) if he should 
wish to do so. 
On the other hand, turning to sheet 4 of Exhibit 2 
(R. 20), we find listed the communities which are paid 
nothing as franchise fees or occupation tax. They include 
among others equally insignificant, the towns of Alton, 
Amalga, Annabella and Antimony; Henefer, Henrieville, 
Hiawatha and Honeyville ; Paradise, Paragonah, Perry 
and Pickleville. It is doubtful if many lifetime residents 
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of Utah will have any idea where they are, and many 
people will never have heard of some of them. There 
is no definite information in the record, but it is obvious 
that few of them will have their own exchanges, and 
very few will actually serve, through wires and cables 
upon their public streets, any great number of sub-
scribers outside their corporate limits. In the.se areas 
the bulk of the subscribers obviously live at a relatively 
great distance from the central exchanges, and there are 
obviously fewer of them, so that the unit cost of equal 
service will be higher-how much higher the Company 
was not interested in saying nor the Commission in 
hearing. Yet under present rate policies these areas are 
the ones where the subscriber pays the lowest rates 
for service, because he has available at his local exchange 
a smaller number of telephones he can call, without toll 
charge. 
Obviously under these eircumstances the bulk of the 
Company's profits are derived from the franchise com-
munities, and those communities in fact now bear some 
substantial proportion of the burden and expense of 
serving the other areas, some of which, as the Company 
admits, may very well be [and probably are] operated 
at a loss, and contribute nothing to the overall ope,ra-
tion. 
The urban, franchise areas are "carrying" the out-
side areas, and the discrimination existing is agaitnst 
rather than in favor of the franchise areas. Very likely 
that is just why the Company has protected its position 
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in the franchise areas by negotiating long term franchise 
agreements with these cities, and why the Commission 
has approved the franchises when submitted. 
The Company and the Commission obviously have 
forced the shoe on the wrong foot. The Commission's 
finding (if any there is) of discrimination against non-
franchise areas not only is unsupported by any competent 
evidence, it is also contrary to the necessary inferences 
which must be drawn from the evidence before it. Its 
order cannot be allowed to stand. 
Although it seems that recently utilities all over the 
nation, led and guided by the American Telephone and 
Telegraph Company, are recently seeking to "pass on" 
franchise fees and rentals, etc., to their city subscribers, 
we have been been able to find only one case in which 
a court of last resort has had occasion to review and pass 
upon the sufficiency of the evide~ce adduced to support 
the utility's claim (nobly and unselfishly made in behalf 
of its downtrodden rural customers) that franchise fees 
discriminate against rural users. But the facts there are 
so nearly identical with the facts in this case, and the 
reasoning there adopted by the very learned and able 
Supreme Court of Missouri is so applicable and cogent 
that we cannot forebear to examine and quote from it 
at some length. We believe it will be very helpful to 
this court. We submit the principles there declared are 
controlling here. 
That case is 
State vs. Public Service Commission, 245 
S.W. 2nd 851 (Mo., 1952). 
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There is a priYatPly owned utility, the St. Louis 
County 'Yater Cmnpany, supplied water to 66 incor-
porated and nu1nerous unincorporated areas in St. Louis 
County, .Jlissouri. Its rates had always been fixed on 
a systen1 wide basis. Later 16 of the incorporated are~as 
levied special taxes upon the gross receipts of the Com-
pany. Conceiving that these rates resulted in discrimin-
ation against consumers in non-taxing areas, the Com-
pany filed with the Public Service Commission a new 
schedule of rates, which (as here) made no change in 
the basic rates, but added the amount of the gross re-
ceipts taxes to the bills of consumers within the taxing 
municipalities, except that in cities where the Company 
had a franchise, the C ompawy proposed to absorb the 
first 2% (apparently as a reasonable franchise or rental 
fee) and to charge the balance to the consumers within 
the municipality. 
The Commission found that it was "an unjust dis-
crimination for the water consumers of one area to be 
burdened with any part of the taxes levied or payments 
exacted by another area" and "that the consumers in 
any and all municipalities which seek to obtain revenue 
from such taxes or payments should bear the burden of 
providing such revenue." The Commission, moreover, 
regarded the franchises as immaterial, and held that the 
entire tax, "whether in the nature of license taxes, 
occupation taxes, street rentals, franchise payments" or 
otherwise should be paid by consumers within the muni-
cipality receiving the same. 
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The Commission also held that recovery of these 
expenses should be made in the rates themselves, rather 
than by adding the same to the bill as a separate item. 
(In this the Missouri Commission's order differs from 
the order in our case, as will be demonstrated in a later 
section of this brief.) It accordingly ordered new rate 
schedules filed which would include an allocation of 
these payments. 
Thereupon the City of St. Louis procured from 
the Missouri Supreme Court a writ of review. 
The court observed that this was not a general rate 
hearing, but a proposal by the Company (and not a con-
sumer) to adjust inequalities resulting from the taxes. 
(This is also true of the case at bar.) 
The court observed that the Commission might have 
classified the cities and towns and fixed rates on a unit 
basis, but that the Company is organized and operates 
on a system wide basis, and all its properties, "irre-
spective of the conglomerate political subdivisions in 
its system, have been valued, and both rates and the right 
to a fair return have been determined upon that basis." 
It deelared, 
"* * * all taxes, including taxes on gross re-
ceipts, are a part of operating expense, * * * .and 
no doubt were and may be taken into considera-
tion by the Company when it becomes necessary 
to determine or redetermine rates or a fair return. 
* * * But regardless of the respective merits of 
the two methods of operation, the Company oper-
ates on the system wide basis, and the Commission 
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has heretofore approYed its rates and return on 
that basis, and both are now in the anomalous 
position of disregarding the system basis and 
treating this one item of operating expense upon 
a segregated, municipal nnit basis." (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
(This also is true in the case at bar.) 
The court then examined the facts and the record 
to determine whether or not the payments to the muni-
cipalities did in fact result in discrimination. Attempt-
ing to prove disparity, the Company had submitted the 
following: 
1. Charts showing gross revenue per customer, and 
ranking the cities levying the tax ; 
2. Charts ranking the tax levying cities by gross 
revenue per mile; and 
3. Charts ranking the tax levying areas with respect 
to revenue received from such areas as compared to 
taxes paid. 
The Commission found that in 24 of the 66 cities 
served, about 75% of the revenue received came from 
the taxing cities. But there were no charts showing 
total gross receipts, or net income, nor any demonstra-
tion that there was any impairment of the Company's 
fair return in the areas levying the tax. 
(Obviously the applicant there went farther than 
the happlicant here in attempting to prove discrimin-
ation without reasonable basis-and failed.) 
The Court there says : 
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"The Order and the Company's position 
erroneously presuppose that there was no dis-
cnimination in the former uniform rates in the 
.first place and, of course, that assumption is 
without foundation. * * * It certainly costs the 
Company less to serve some areas than it does 
others, and necessarily there is a corresponding 
discrimination inherent in uniform rates through-
out the system. In the areas that are less costly 
to serve there is undoubtedly a greater profit 
to the Company than in the more costly areas 
and that results in discrimination in rates ·in 
favor of the costly areas. If any of the municipal-
ities levying the tax are in the less costly ar.ea-s, 
the addition of the tax to their water rates obvi-
ous1y increases the burden of tbe discrimination. 
There is no data in this record from which precise 
information may be obtained, but for the most 
part the cities levying the tax are the greatest 
in density of population and contribute the great-
er .sums to both the Company's gross and net 
revenue. Those areas in which the Company 
'has a franchise or -valuable contract rights -cer-
tainly make the greater contribution to the Com-
pany's stability and successful operation. From 
an ope-rational standpoint they are in a more 
favorable position for rate making purposes than 
.some isolated, unincorporated area, or some other 
more costly area, and yet uniform .rates ignore 
these disparities. In short, there is a disparity 
in the ·former uniform system wide raies and ·the 
discrimination is favoraole, undoubtedly, to thB 
more costly areas, and the taxes involv.ed in this 
proceeding may or may not shift that unfavor-
able disparity; from all that appears in this 
record .tme ttaxes may .have equalized the previ-
ously existing ilnequalities. But if it does, it does 
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not necessarily follow that the amount of the 
resulting difference is precisely the amount of 
the ta...\:, or that a exceeds the more favorable rate 
previously enjoyed by the more costly opera-
tional areas or, in short, that the discrimination 
is unfair and unjust. 
··There is no reasonable basis upon this 
record for the Commission's finding and order; 
accordingly the judgment is reversed." (Empha-
sis added.) 
The case is obviously and exactly in point, and 
supports completely the position of the City herein. 
Moreover it is in complete harmony with the principles 
established by our Utah Statutes and by this Court in 
the case of 
~Iountain States Tel. and Tel. Company vs. 
Public Service Commission, 105 Utah 
230, 142 Pac. 2nd 873; Rehearing de-
nied 105 Utah 266, 145 Pac. 2nd 790, 
holding that a Commission order purporting to equal-
ize rates is invalid unless based on "evidence calculated 
to show that existing * * * rates were inherently un-
reasonable." 
The only other cases we have found dealing with 
the establishment of rate practices in which it was pro-
posed that franchise fees or occupational taxes be 
''passed on'' to the local consumer as an addition to his 
basic rate are .oot in point. They are 
City of Elmhurst v. Western United Gas Com-
pany (111., 1936) 1 N. E. 2nd 144, and 
State vs. Department of Public Welfare 142 Pac. 
2nd 498, 532 (Wash. 1943). 
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In neither of these cases was there a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence to prove that existing prac-
tice of handling these items as general operating ex-
pense produced an unfair or unreasonable discrimin-
ation against outside consumers. Moreover, in each of 
these cases, as the Missouri Court observes in its case 
above cited, there was a complete valuation of prop-
erties and complete determination of rates and fair 
return. And the Washington case distinguishes the 
EJ.mhurst case. It was decided under a statute author-
izing, apparently, the segregation of single municipalit-
ies as regional units, and the fixing of uniform rates 
within the city unit. That is a basically different sit-
ation. 
The assumption that the assumed difference in bur-
den discriminates against the ratepayer outside the 
franchising municipalities is unjustified, and is against 
the law and the evidence. 
Third, it was assumed that the assumed difference 
and dicrimination is exactly equal to the amount of the 
tax in each municipality involved. This is obvious from 
the fact that the Commission purported to correct such 
discrimination by its order authorizing the exact amount 
of the tax to be "passed on" to rate payers within each 
municipality. It made no attempt to inquire as to pos-
sible compensating factors, such as variations in labor 
cost, in ad valorem taxes, in building rentals or in cost 
of private easements for pole-lines and cables. It made 
no inquiry as to whether or not there was, in the seve.ral 
areas, relative equality of re~turn in proportion to the 
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capital investment in property used in serving such 
areas. Doubtless an audit and complete study will show 
that discrimination exists, and will disclose the amount 
thereof for or against the several arease, hut the assert-
ions without examination of the facts and background, 
that the rates found satisfactory seven months before 
now discriminate in the amount of the tax, to the very 
penny and to the hundredth of a per cent in each of 46 
cities, under widely differing conditions, strains credulity 
to the breaking point, and assumes without proof a fact 
which could not possibly oecur in one chance out of bil-
lions. It serves only to point up that the Company and 
the Commission were proceeding upon a premise basic-
ally wrong in fact and law. 
This presumption just assumes the impossible. If 
rates are to be adjusted on a community level, evidence 
must be taken to establish a reasonable basis for the 
adjustment to be made in each community, and specific 
findings made for each community fixing the amount 
and the direction of each adjustment. 
To order an adjustment equal to the amount of the 
tax, without any evidence to prove that the discrimina-
tion equals that amount is to act arbitrarily and capri-
ciously, and in violation of the rule of law placing the 
burden of proof on the proponent Company. Whether 
in this case the burde.n of proof is conceived of as being 
the "risk of persuasion" or only the "burden of going 
forward," is quite immaterial, for here the Company 
has supported neither burden, and the order it procured 
from the Commission must fall. 
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Fourth, it was assumed that there was no reason-
able basis for the assumed difference and discrimination. 
It is of course recognized that differences in cost 
of service, in capital invested in rendering service, in 
service rendered and in operating conditions justify a 
difference in rate. If differences in operating conditions, 
costs, etc., differ, then the rates also must differ, and 
an exactly compensated, equal rate is unreasonable. Such 
was the rule established by this court in the Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph Comparwy case} supra. 
Indeed, we do not believe that defendants here 
would contend for any other rule. The Company fought 
for and established that rule in that case, and pre-
sumably its present rate system is based thereon. How-
ever, if it be ·conceded that in this case the burden of 
existing rates varies from community to community, 
so do the rates} and there is no evidence to show that 
the relation between burden and rate in any community 
was not fair and reasonable, nor was any attack made 
on the order of August 10, 1951, which must, under the 
law, be presumed to have been regularly and properly 
entered, and based on necessary evidence. 
And it will be remembered that the Company's only 
witness, its Utah Manager, testified positively that he 
had no evidence to present to show whether any com-
munity was or was not bearing its fair share of the 
costs in the overall picture. ( R. 149-150). 
Apparently the Commission realized this, for it 
found only (and inferentially) that the franchise fees 
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and the ta...~e~ re~ulted in discrimination. It did not find 
that the di~eriininntion 'n1s tu1reasonable, and in making 
an order "ithout such finding it acted arbitrarily, con-
trary to established law, and in excess of its juris-
diction. 
The Connnission's order here is not based on any 
evidence showing that present rates are unreasonable, 
and it 1nnst fall under the authority of the Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph Company case, supra, 
which the Company itself brought here. 
Sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. In 
this old precept lies the very essence of justice, western 
style. 
Inasmuch as the Company and the Commission are 
now flirting with the idea of turning further away from 
the system wide basis for rates and towards a local 
community or exchange basis, it probably is not amiss 
here to raise a query as to the validity of the present 
quasi-exchange basis where the urban subscriber's tele-
phone rate is based on the number of telephones on his 
exchange available to his call, whether or not he has 
any use for them. The Company and the Commission 
shudder at the thought of apportioning capital and 
costs of operation (except taxes which can be "passed 
on") upon a local commtu1ity basis, with appropriate 
variation in rates to match, but they already, and hap-
pily, apportion the fancied benefits of telephone service 
according to the size of the exchange, and vary the rates 
accordingly. 
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It seems unlikely that there is a sound and reason-
able basis for the discrimination last mentioned. Year 
in and year out, it is doubtful that the average sub-
scriber in Ogden calls more than fifty telephones, more 
or less, from his residence phone, or is called by more 
than about 50 other subscribers. Very few people "get 
around" so much that they have even a "phoning ac-
quaintance" with fifty other families or business firms. 
Twenty or thirty families and a half dozen business 
firms would (as a guess) be nearer the limit of the aver-
age residence telephone subscriber's circle. But notwith-
standing this relatively limited use in practice, the 
Ogden subscriber must pay rates based on the 20,000, 
more or less, telephones he could dial if he wanted to 
embark upon that monumental and idle effort. 
If rate structures must be re-examined on a local 
basis, as the Company here proposes, then the only fair 
and just method, and, we submit, the only legal method, 
is to re-examine all factors of rate structure on a local 
basis, including this rate system which obviously charges 
the highest rate for the service provided at lowest cost 
in order to give service at less than cost to some remote 
and sparsely settled community. To make local adjust-
ments on any other basis is to play tag with justice 
in the dark, and must inevitably result in unreasonable 
and unfair discriminations arrived at by purest guess 
work. 
We do not believe that the Company and the Com-
mission can fairly and reasonably make local rate 
differentials solely with regard to the cost of franchise 
34 
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fees or occupation taxE's. \Y e do not believe they can 
be "a little bit pregnant" with local rate making and 
still comply with the law. 
This court n1ight well save much time and trouble 
if it would establish for the Commission's guidance in 
possible further proceedings, the principles above out-
lined, which, it is submitted, must be followed if the 
defendants here are to proceed with their project of 
rate making on a local basis. 
This court has already held in the Mountain States 
Telephone and Telegraph Company case, supra, that 
rates should be established that will as near as possible 
yield a fair return on property used in rendering each 
class of service. (Syllabus No. 9). Here, although the 
several communities are classified for rate making, no 
attempt was made to prove that the communities who 
boldd bear the increased burden imposed hy the order 
are not already yielding the Company a fair return on 
the property used in serving them. 
At any rate, the Commission's present order is based 
on a finding of diS'crimination unfounded on any evi-
dence, and it should be vacated. 
The only other cases we have found dealing with 
the establishment of rate practices in which it was pro-
posed that franchise fees or occupational taxes be 
"passed on" to the local consumer as an addition to his 
basic rate are: 
City of Elmhurst v, Western United Gas 
Company (Ill., 1936) 1 N.E. 2nd 144, and 
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State vs. Department of Public Service, 142 
Pac. 2nd 498, 532 (Wash. 1943). 
In neither of these cases was there a challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that existing 
practice of handling these items as general operating 
expense produced an unfair or unreasonable discrimina-
tion against outside consumers. Moreover, in each of 
these cases, as the Missouri Court observes in its case 
above cited, there was a complete valuation of proper-
ties and complete determination of rates and fair return. 
And the Washington case distinguishes the Elmhurst 
case. It was decided under a statute authorizing, appar-
ently, the segregation of single municipalities as regional 
units, and the fixing of uniform rates withitn the city 
unit. That is a basically different situation. 
We do not believe that the Company and the Com-
mission can fairly and reasonably make local rate differ-
entials solely with regard to the cost of franchise fees 
or occupation taxes. We do not believe they can be "a 
little bit pregnant" with local rate making and still 
comply with the law. 
POINT 3. There is no evidence to support the find-
ing of the Commission to the effect that the Company's 
customers outside the cities (including 0 gden City) con-
tribute a part of the franchise fees and special taxes, 
while receiving little or no direct benefit ther·efrom. 
We have already pointed out that the only evidence 
in the record indicates that telephone users in the en-
franchising cities in fact contribute to the support of 
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.service to users outside such cities, rather than vice 
versa, and we will not belabor that point. 
However, the Commission also states in its Report 
(R. 29) that the outside customers receive little or no 
direct benefit from the use to which the tax receipts are 
put. This statement also requires some consideration. 
It is submitted that the finding is unsupported by and is 
contrary to the evidence. It is further submitted 'that 
the finding ·is completely irrelevant, and is based on a 
misconception of the nature and ·purpose of franchise 
fees, or "'street rentals," paid by utilities to municipal-
ities. 
As we -have said, Ogden's franchise agreement with 
the Company is clearly established as one in tne nature 
of a 25 year contract leasing to the Com,pa~y the privi-
lege of using the city's public streets and alleys for pole 
lines, ._telephone cables, etc., in the prosecution :of the 
Company's ;private business, which it ver:y properly ~c.on­
ducts for private profit. This is a privilege wJrich no 
private person or corporation may .enjoy as of right. 
It m~y be enjoyed only upon special .grant from the 
so-rereign in Utah, the sovereign people. These con-
cepts are fundamental, and in accord with the :authori-
ties generally. See 
Utah Light and Traction Company vs. Public 
Service Commission, 101 Utah 99, 118 
Pac. 2nd 683, 689. 
See-also 
23 Am. J ur. "Franchises," § § 2 to 8, pp. 714 
to 720; and 
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37 C.J.S. "Franchises," § § 1 to 14, pp. 141 
to 158. 
In Utah, the people have delegated to the local 
authorities the exclusive right to grant this privilege 
to telephone companies as to city streets, and have 
specifically forbidden the legislature to grant any such 
right without the consent of local authority. The sov-
ereign people, in 
Article XII, 'Section 8 of the Constitution of 
Utah, 
have declared that 
"No law shall be passed granting the right 
to construct and operate a * * * telephone or 
electric light plant within any city * * * without 
the consent of the local authorities who have 
control of the street or highway proposed to be 
occupied for such purposes." 
This court has held that, even assuming that this 
constitutional provision has no application to inter-
urban railroads, a municipality clearly has the right 
to grant or withhold the right to the use of the streets 
therein, and thus to impose conditions respectilng the 
use thereof for purposes other than the right of ordi-
nary travel thereon. 
Shortino vs. Salt Lake and U. R. Co., 52 
Utah 476,488, 174 Pac. 860. 
The Legislature has, perhaps superfluously, imple-
mented this right granted cities by the Constitution. In 
Section 15-8-14, U.C.A. 1943, 
it has provided that 
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··They [the City Com1nissions] may construct, 
maintain and operate * * * telephone lines * * *' 
or authorize the construction, maintenance and 
operation of the same by others * * *." 
And in 
Section 15-8-13, U.C.A., 1943, 
it has provided that 
'"They 1nay regulate the * * • use of streets 
"'"'"'" 
In the case of 
Union Pac. R. Company vs. Public Service 
Commission, 103 Utah 186, 134 Pac. 2nd 
±69 (Syllabi 7, 8 and 9), 
this Court held that, under the constitutional and stat-
utory grants of power to cities, a city may impose terms 
and conditions upon its grant of a franchise, and revoke 
the franchise for breach thereof. It further held that, 
although the provisions of a franchise agreement with 
respect to rates are subordinate to the Commission's 
exclusive control of rates, in all other matters respect-
ing franchises for the special use of city streets the 
city's powers and rights are not in any way subject to 
the control of the Commission. The Court commented 
that inasmuch as it construed the Public Utilities Act 
as not granting the Commission any jurisdiction over 
city street franchises, no question is presented of dele-
gation of municipal functions to a special commission 
in violation of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitu-
tion. 
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It is clear that, in using Ogden's streets and the 
streets of her sister cities, the Company is enjoying a 
special privilege which it could not enjoy except by 
consent of and arrangement with the local representa-
tives of the inhabitants. These streets have been opened, 
improved and maintained by the inhabitants, either 
by special assessment levied on the abutting property 
owners or by general tax levy on all property owners 
within the corporate limits. The streets belong to the 
cities' inhabitants. In using the streets for telephone 
lines, the Company imposes thereon a special burden, 
and enjoys a special privilege which no other inhabitant 
or taxpayer enjoys. It is only proper that it should 
compensate the inhabitants for suffering that burden 
and granting that privilege. 
"But," say the Company and the Commission (with 
one voice), "the money to pay that compensation comes 
in part from telephone users outside the city, who do 
not participate in the spending thereof, and therefore 
they get no benefit therefrom, and are injured." 
The answer is that the first part of the charge is 
not true, as hereinabove demonstrated, and the second 
part looks on the wrong side of the problem, and is 
equally untrue. Conceding for the moment (for the 
sake of argument only) that the outside users do not 
participate in the benefit of the spendilng by the city, 
it does not follow that they do not benefit directly and 
materially from the payment. 
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They are pa~ing for phone service. They get it. 
In the course of rendering that service the Company 
uses the city streets. EYery time the rural subscriber 
uses his phone his call travels along the Company's lines 
in the streets of the city where the Franchise is located. 
He cannot complete a phone call even to a rural neighbor 
across the street without using the streets of the ex-
change city. In \Yeber County, as an example, the phones 
of the entire county (and part of Davis County), with 
the exception of about 300, phones in the Huntsville Area, 
are on the Ogden Exchange. Every call from a rural 
subscriber travels over the streets of one or the other 
of these municipalities - and could not be completed 
were it not that the citizens of these municipalities accord 
to them, through the Company, the privilege of clearing 
the calls through their streets. It is significant that in 
Weber County only the two exchange cities, Ogden and 
Huntsville, are paid franchise fees. (R. 18). 
If the Company were compelled to obtain exclusively 
private rights-of-way for its pole lines and cables within 
the City limits, in order to serve its rural subseribers, 
the cost to the Company and the subscribers would 
doubtless be very substantially higher. 
Moreover, from an examination of the list of en-
franchising cities (R. 18), it is apparent that they are 
the central exchanges in the Company's complex of inter-
connecting long distance service. The inference is clear 
and necessary that relatively very few long distance calls 
are handled by the Company in Utah without routing the 
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message through the streets of one of several of these 
municipalities. Here again is a direct benefit in tele-
phone service and use of streets resulting to the users 
of telephones throughout the state. 
Elsewhere in its findings the Commission recognizes 
this benefit, when it says: 
"It is undoubtedly true that telephone sub-
scribers outside Ogden City limits are benefited 
by reason of being served by the same telephone 
utility and through the same exchange as sub-
scribers residing within the limits of the City of 
Ogden. . . . When a subscriber in Ogden calls a 
station in Roy the conversation is carried over 
lines traversing the streets of Ogden for a dis-
tance, and over lines in Weber County outside the 
City of Ogden for a much longer distance. The 
same situation is true when a party in Roy caJls 
a party in Ogden." (R. 32-Emphasis added.) 
The, Commission also observes ( R. 32) that 
"Ogden City also receives ad valorem tax 
benefits from telephone plant facilities located 
within the limits of Ogden City which are devoted 
to serving subscribers outside the City limits." 
But it neglected to observe that the outside subscribers 
also receive the benefit of ad valorem taxes on that city 
plant by virtue of the county levy thereon. It neglected 
to observe that under Utah law the property-owning 
city subscriber pays a tax (through the County levy) to 
maintain County roads along which the Company's lines 
run, but that there is no compensating tax on County 
property to maintain the City streets which are used 
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for all County calls. And it neglected to observe that 
none of these ad Yaloren1 ta.~es pays for, or entitles the 
taxpayers in question to, the special privilege of using 
the city streets for the stringing of telephone lines and 
the laying and relaying of underground telephone cables. 
In neglecting these matters, the Commission failed 
to take into account factors of vital importance involved 
in a proper deternrination of whether the city subscriber 
benefits at the hands of his country cousin, or vice versa. 
Not having considered these matters, it is apparent that 
the Commission's finding that the country subscriber 
receives no benefit from his pittance of franchise money 
is a mere guess, and not founded on any evidence. 
The City, however, does heartily concur in the fol-
lowing finding of the Commission: 
"Where the benefits flow and to whom is 
highly conjectural and cannot be accurately meas-
ured." (R. 32-Emphasis added.) 
Now that is exactly what we are contending: the 
finding that the country subscribers receive no benefits 
from franchise fees paid is only a guess or conjecture 
and cannot be measured or supported. The Commission 
here recognizes that there is in the record absolutely no 
evidence to form the necessary basis for any comparison 
-and the Company admitted it had no such evidence 
available. 
This finding is an admission by the Commission that 
its Order is based on mere conjecture. With such an 
43 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
admission in the Record, neither the finding of "no bene-
fit to country subscribers" nor the order based thereon 
can stand. 
The fact that the franchise fee is not spent directly 
on the country subscriber by the City authorities after 
it has been received by them of course is utterly irrele-
vant. They receive their benefit-their quid pro quo-
in the special privilege of using the City's streets in 
completing phone calls. 
Exactly the same argument can be made with equal 
force (or rather, with equal lack of force) that city ad 
valorem taxes paid by the Company should be charged 
back to city subscribers because they vary in amount, 
and are spent on city projects rather than to benefit 
telephone subscribers in the far corners of the state. 
Exactly the same argument can be made with equal 
force (or rather, equal lack of force) that the landlord 
who rents an office building to the Company for an ex-
change should have the amount of the rent charged back 
to him on his telephone bill because he spends it on him-
self and his family, instead of using it to buy hats or 
telephone taborets for all other subscribers. This is 
absurb, and the premise on which the argument is based 
is patently false. The attempted determination of rela-
tive benefits is without foundation either in evidence, 
in logic, or in law. It must fall. 
POINT 4. The finding of the Commission, to the 
effect that there is no evidence that the City's franchise 
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contract leas ern.fered into with the intent that the funds 
to pay the city for the rights thereby acquired by the 
Company would come from the general income of the 
Company, is contrary to all of the competent evide:nce 
in the proceeding, and contrary to law. 
The Company's franchise with Ogden was "negoti-
ated" by its manager in 19-!1. (R. 125). At that time the 
established rate structure, approved by the Commission, 
was on a state-wide basis, and the cost of all franchise 
fees was "absorbed" by the Company as a general ex-
pense. It was treated as a general expense in computing 
rates, in accord with the almost universal practice. 
The manager understood at the time that the Ogden 
City officials, in entering into the negotiations and into 
the franchise, acted in a representative capacity, and that 
the inhabitants of Ogden were the real parties in inte.r-
est. (R. 127). That is the way our republican form of 
government works-through representative public ser-
vants. 
The manager, and, obviously, the representatives of 
the city also understood and recognized the difference 
between the state sales tax and the federal excise tax 
on telephones, on the one hand, and franchise fees and 
occupation taxes on the other, and that the burden of the 
; former is imposed on the consumer, or customer, while 
the latter is imposed on the Company enjoying the bene-
fits of the franchise or the license to do business. (R. 
127-128). 
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It was also understood that the franchise fee and 
free service to be paid and rendered to the City under 
the franchise contract were in consideration of the grant 
of the franchise privilege to use the city streets for the 
Company's telephone business. (R. 125-126). 
The obvious and necessary inference from this his-
tory and background, and from the situation of the par-
ties is that in entering into the franchise agreement with 
the Company, the object of the City officials was to make 
a contract beneficial to the people they represented. 
Their object in selling this privilege for the special use 
of the streets at a stipulated consideration in money to 
be paid and services to be rendered was obviously to 
benefit the City's inhabitants by exacting from the Com-
pany a quid pro quo which would either result in lower 
taxes or in higher services to the general inhabitants-
and in this connection it must be noted that a city is not 
operated for profit, but for service to its citizens. 
If the purpose of the parties had been merely to aid 
the company, or merely to facilitate the rendering of 
telephone service to the city's population, it would have 
been idle-it would even have been a hind;rance to the 
accomplishment of that purpose to exact a consideration 
for the franchise grant. If the purpose had been no more, 
the franchise ordinance and collateral agreement (R. 21-
22) would not have provided for payment of a consider-
ation. In such event all payments would have been waiv-
ed, as has been done in many cities, according to the 
Company's manager. Obviously the purpose and intent 
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of both the city offieials and the Company :Manager were 
to benefit the real parties in interest: the inhabitants 
of the city. 
It is equally obYions that this purpose would be 
frustrated if the exact an1ount and value of this consid-
eration were immediately charged back to the inhabi-
tants as a surcharge upon their particular telephone bills. 
That process merely puts money in one pocket and re-
moves it from another, and no benefit whatever accrues. 
By that process the inhabitants part with a valuable right 
in their streets and, in the final analysis, they get nothing 
in return. 
Clearly the parties had no such purpose in mind. 
Clearly it was intended that the money to pay the fran-
chise fees would come out of the general income of the 
Company, in accordance with the then prevailing prac-
tice and the situation of the parties at the time. 
Perhaps a simplified illustration will aid in present-
ing this point. Suppose the Company should at a rental 
of $100 per month, lease an exchange building from a 
family corporation with only five stockholders. Suppose 
further that each stockholder is a telephone subscriber. 
And now suppose that the Company proposes to add 
$20 to the monthly telephone bill of each stockholder, 
for the express and declared purpose of exacting the rent 
from the stockholders, "because the landlord corporation 
spends the rent money on the stockholders, and not on 
the rest of the Company's subscribers!" 
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This illustration, we believe, reduces the principle 
espoused by the Company and the Commission to its 
utterly silly essentials. Who can reasonably contend that, 
in such a case, either the landlord corporation or the 
Company intended that the rental should be exacted by 
the Company from the landlord's five stockholders-or 
from any three or four of them~ 
Clearly there was no such intention in this case, but 
the parties intended that the franchise fee would be 
paid out of the Company's general income so that Ogden's 
stockholder-inhabitants can enjoy the fruits and bene-
fits of the franchise contract made for them. 
Perhaps we should add a brief reference to the law 
governing the construction of franchise contracts. 
Except that franchise contracts are always construed 
most strictly against the grantee Company, 
37 C.J.S., p. 167, notes 7 to 9, 
the rules applicable to the construction of contracts gen-
erally apply to the construction of a franchise contract. 
37 C.J.S., p.166, note 95. 
Accordingly the intention of the parties governs, 
37 C.J.S., p. 167, note 1; 
and if the terms are ambiguous, the purpose of the par-
ties and the history of the negotiations may be consider-
ed. Ibid., note 5. 
It is, of course, a general rule of contract construc-
tion that the nature and object of the agreement and the 
situation of the parties may be considered. 
17 C.J.S., p. 744. 
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The construction given the contract by the parties 
may also be considered. 
17 C.J.S., p. 755. 
In this latter connection, it is significant that for ten 
years after Ogden's contract was negotiated the Com-
pany, without any question, paid the franchise fee out of 
its general incon1e, and made no attempt to "pass it on" 
to the city's stockholder-inhabitants until the move was 
suggested by the Commission. ( R. 110). As soon as that 
was done, the move was actively opposed by the City as 
a breach of faith. Here is a clear construction of the con-
tract by the long continued manner in which the party 
obligated has performed. 
Moreover, the law of the place where the contract 
was made, in effect at the time the obligation was entered 
upon, is deemed a part of the contract. 
17 C.J.S., p. 782. 
Here the established method of constructing rates, 
approved by the legislative assent of the Commission 
from the beginning of rate making in Utah, treated 
franchise fees as general operating expense to be paid 
out of general income. For fifty years the Commission 
has applied this rule, and the Legislature, which must 
have known of the practice, has taken no steps to revise 
it. Clearly the rule has legislative approval, and is an 
integral part of the utility rate making law of Utah. 
As such it became part of the Franchise contract, and 
determines the nature of the Company's obligation there-
under. 
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And in the case of 
State v. Department of Public Service, 
(Washington, 1943) 142 Pac. 2nd, 498, 
536, Syllabi 44-45, 
the Supreme Court of Washington held, as a matter 
of law, that reasonable franchise payments for special 
street privileges, are part of a utility's general operating 
expense, and must be paid out of general income. It 
was held error for the Washington Department to di-
rect that they be charged to the ratepayers of cities where 
franchises were held. As Ogden's contract is a contract 
for a· franchise fee (and not an occupation tax) this case 
is exactly in point here and should be followed, and the 
order of the Commission here requiring the "passing on" 
of Ogden's franchise fee to her inhabitant telephone sub-
scribers should be vacated. 
The finding of the Commission here that there was 
no evidence of intent that Ogden's franchise payments 
were to be made out of general income is against all the 
evidence and against the law, and erroneously places on 
the city the burden of proof. It cannot stand. 
POINT 5. The Order of the Commission impairs 
the obligation of the Company's franchise contract with 
the City and its inhabitants in violation of Article I, Sec-
tion 10, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States, 
and of Article I, Section 18 of the Constitution of Utah. 
It is apparent from what has been before that the 
order of the Commission impairs the obligation of the 
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l 
m. 
][ 
Company upon its franchise contract made by Ogden 
City for the benefit of its inhabitants, the real parties 
in interest. It is therefore unconstitutional and void. 
\Yhen this point "·as pressed before the Commission, 
the Company raised two points in attempted answer: 
first, that the obligation was not impaired, and second, 
that a city cannot clai1n the protection of these provisions 
of the national and state constitutions. It is submitted 
that neither answer has any validity here. 
In the first place, it is here conceded that the City's 
!E 
inhabitants are the real parties in interest; the contract 
was for their benefit. Before the Order, the Company 
paid their representatives, out of its own funds, the 
amount of the franchise fee, and it was expended by their 
public servants for their account and benefit. After 
the Order, it is true, the franchise fee will still be paid 
to the public servants of the inhabitants, to be expended 
·- for their benefit, but the obligation to make that pay-
ment has been lifted from the obligor Company and sad-
dler! upon the obligee inhabitants. The obligee has been 
forced to assume the obligation; the inhabitants have be-
come both obligee and obligor; and the Company, for-
merly the obligor, has been relieved of all obligation ex-
~[: cept to act as agent to gather the franchise fee from the 
available inhabitants and deliver it to their servants i~ 
,f[i for expenditure. The obligation of the Company has 
been whittled down from that of a debtor owing rentals 
~ for a special street privileg-e, to that of a mere collecting 
~~ agent. 
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It is as if the maker of a note were to be authorized 
to say to the payee, "Of course I'll pay you-but only 
when and if I have extracted the wherewithall from your 
pocket book." 
It is idle to say that the obligation is not impaired. 
The entire essence and benefit thereof has been de-
stroyed. 
A recognition of this practical result, which the 
Commission obviously intended, is implicit in the quo-
tation from its f1nding in the Mountain States Fuel 
Supply Company case (P.S.C. No. 3755), which quota-
tion it affectionately and approvingly included in its 
findings here : 
"If the customers of gas within the limits of 
cities which impose such revenue measures are _ 
cognizant of the burdens imposed upon them by 
their city officials, such customers will keep those 
taxes or fees within reasonable limits .... " (Em-
phasis supplied.) 
The Commission found that "This finding applies with 
equal force in this case." (R. 34). It was obviously aware 
that by virtue of its order the "benefit" (R. 29) of re-
ceipts of franchise fees would now become a "burden" 
(R. 34) to the city subscriber, a burden the Commission 
expects him .to throw off. 
If it be argued that the obligation runs to the muni-
cipal corporation, and not to the citizen-inhabitant stock-
holders, and the obligation to the corporation has not 
been impaired, the answer is three-fold. First, it is 
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court may have heard their shouts of "Robbery!" even 
as far as Salt Lake City. 'Yhen the corporate fiction of 
the city is disregarded, as it n1nst be here in the interests 
of justice, and the City Government's representative 
function is recognized, they stand before the court un-
encumbered to claim their constitutional rights. Two of 
them, ~Ir. \V'". I. Lowe, and 1Ir. Clarence E. Smith, per-
sonally stood before the Commission below. 
The second reply is that the rule is based upon con-
siderations which have no application in Utah to these 
facts. The reason behind the rule is that municipal 
corporations are regarded as mere creatures of the state, 
whose very existence depends upon the whim of the state 
legislature which created them, and which can deprive 
them of any right, as it can deprive them of existence. 
But that situation does not obtain in Utah, and espe-
cially in the case of Ogden City. In Utah under Article 
XII, Section 8 of the Constitution, the legislature cannot 
interefere with the City's franchise power. It might re-
peal the general laws under which all cities (except 
_ Ogden) exist (Constitution, Article XI, Section 5), but 
so long as it allows them to exist as municipal corpora-
- tions it cannot infringe their rights under the Constitu-
.. tion to grant or withhold telephone franchises, and im-
/ pose conditions respecting the same. Only the people 
can do that, by constitutional amendment, and they have 
_ not acted. Only the Commission, the creature of the legis-
;: lature has attempted to act, and it is elementary that the 
legislature cannot delegate to a commission, its creature, 
~~ powers which it does not itself have. See 
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See also 
16 C.J.S., pp. 344, note 61; 339, note 14(3); 
and 342, note 41. 
City of Columbus v. Public Utilities Commis-
sion (Ohio, 1921) 133 N. E. 800, syllabi 
26 to 31, 
holding that the legislature cannot delegate to the Public 
Utilities Commission power to nullify a City's franchise 
contract in violation of the Federal prohibition against 
impairing contract obligations. 
Furthermore, franchise negotiations under Article 
XII, Section 8, are clearly municipal .functions which 
the Utah legislature is specifically prohibited from dele-
gating to any commission by the provisions of 
Article VI, Section 29, of the Constitution 
of Utah. 
This court held in 
Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Public 
Service Commission, 103 Utah 186, 200-
203, 134 Pac. 2nd 469, 
that a city's power to grant franchises, and impose condi-
tions, is exclusive, and that no order of the Commission 
can reach or affect a city's rule made thereunder. It did 
not apply, however, the Constitutional prohibition; it 
held that the Legislature had not attempted to violate 
the restriction, and that the Commission is without 
statutory authority to regulate the terms of franchise 
contracts. The payment of the franchise fee by the Com-
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pan.y, not the city's citizen beneficiaries, and the render-
ing of free serYice without direct charge to the citizen 
beneficiaries. are in1portant and n1aterial conditions 
properly unposed by Ogden City upon the granting of 
the Franchise. The regulation of those conditions is 
a city function, entirely beyond the scope of the Commis-
sion's authority. The Commission cannot, under the pre-
tense of exercising its rate making power, meddle in ex-
clusively city affairs. 
Furthermore, since Ogden in 1951 adopted the 
"Council-Manager Charter of Ogden City" pursuant to 
the Constitution, Article XI, Section 5, it is no longer de-
pendent on the legislature for its corporate existence. 
It can no longer be abolished, nor its rights impaired by 
any act of the legislature or its creatures. The reason for 
- a city's disqualification to claim constitutional protection 
against the legislature no longer applies to Ogden City. 
It is apparent that in Utah the Legislature has no 
power to meddle in Ogden's franchise contract, and can 
- delegate no such power to the Commission. Therefore 
there is no reason why the City is not free, with respect 
· to such contract, to claim the protection of the Constitu-
:.:.. tional prohibitions against impairing the obligations of 
~ contracts. 
Perhaps it should be added that the rate making 
- power, under the guise and pretense of which the Com-
~ mission proceeded here is a legislative function, covered [il' by the constitutional restriction. 
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43 Am. Jur. "Pub. Util." section 83, p. 624-
5. 
But it must be noted that what the Commission was 
actually trying to do, under this guise and pretense, was 
to regulate city frarnchise contracts. That will be demon-
strated later in this brief. But that is obviously still a 
legislative function. 
The Order is void because it impairs the obligation 
of the Company's franchise contract with the City. 
POINT 6. The Order of the Commission, by au-
thorizing a specific and arbitrary set o [f, releases and 
extinguishes, at least in part, the indebtedness, liability, 
and obligation of the Company to the City under its fran-
chise contract, in violation of Article VI, Sections 27 amii 
29, of the Constitution of Utah. 
Article VI, Section 27, of the Utah Constitution pro-
vides that 
"The Legislature shall have no power tore-
lease or extinguish, in whole or in part, the in-
debtedness, liability, or obligation of any corpora-
tion or person ... to any municipal corporation. 
" 
'Section 29 provides that 
"The Legislature shall not delegate to any 
special commission . . . any power to make, su-
pervise, or interfere with any municipal . . . 
money, property, or effects, whether held in trust 
or otherwise, to levy taxes, . . . or to perform 
any municipal functions." 
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Here is a special protection for contract obligations 
owing to the city, if any is needed. Clearly, neither the 
legislature, nor (a fortiori) its creature, the Commission, 
may release the obligation to Ogden of the Company's 
City franchise contract. 
Yet that is exactly what the Commission has at-
tempted to do, as has been above demonstrated. It has 
attempted to release the Company from its obligation 
to the city and to impose in lieu thereof a new obligation 
upon Ogden City telephone users-including the city, 
for it uses more telephones than the "free service" af-
fords. 
The case of 
St. George v. Public Utilities Commission, 
62 Utah 453, 220 Pac. 720, 
is not in point. The contract there was not a franchise 
contract, protected also by Article XII, Section 8, but was 
a contract for the sale of a municipal power plant for 
- which the consideration, in part at least, was an agree-
ment to furnif:h ''free'' city power for a term. There 
the Commission ordered that the city be charged the 
regular power rates, but fixed and allowed as a cred'it 
;: against these power charges the value of the purchas-
ing company's obligation to furnish "free" service 
:-- for the term. Thus the form, and not the substance of 
the obligation was affected, and the Court approved, 
but even then Justice Gideon doubted the propriety of 
approving a "re-writing" of the City's sale contract. 
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Here the exact reverse is true-the substance, and 
not the form of the obligation is affected. Here the 
Order of the Commission would absolutely cancel the 
Company's obligation, without providing any real com-
pensatory benffit to the city and its inhabitants. It 
clearly violates the Constitutional prohibitions. 
POINT 7. The Order of the Commission is void 
and beyond the powers of the Commission granted by 
the legislat·ure, and is a void attempt to exercise power 
to supervise and interfere with municipal money O!rltd 
property and to levy municipal taxes and perform 
municipal fwnctions, which powers the legislature can-
not validly grant the Commission under Article VI, 
Section 29, and Article XII, Section 8, of the Consti-
tution of Utah. 
The Order of the Commission as above demonstrated 
completely re-writes the franchise contract, in its sub-
stance and effect. If carried out, it would effect a 
novation by which the City's phone-using inhabitants 
would be substituted as obligors in the place of the 
Company. This goes far beyond any mere change in 
form. A contract to grant a franchise in return for 
service as the ''collector'' of a telephone use tax, is 
quite a different thing from a contract to grant a fran-
chise in return for an annual payment by the Com· 
parny of $13,000 in money and services. There are 
obvious and cogent reasons why the latter is much more 
beneficial to the city as a whole, and much to be pre-
ferred when negotating a contract. 
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Clearly the determination of the consideration for, 
and conditions of a franchise grant is a matter of 
municipal policy. Clearly the determination of the 
amount a city occupation tax, and of the person upon 
zrhom the burden thereof shall be imposed, is a matter 
of municipal p•)licy. In the fixing of such policy the 
local authorities are not subject to the control, direct 
or indirect, of the Commission. They are controlled 
only by gener:=tl law, and the Constitution. Matters of 
public policy are not for the Commission. 
Union Pacific Railroad Company vs. Public 
Service Commission, 103 Utah, 186, 200-203, 
and 
Idaho P.::, wer Company vs. Thompson 19 Fed. 2d 
547, 580. 
Under the authority hereinbefore cited, the fixing 
~ of franchise terms and conditions is purely and solely 
a municipal function entirely beyond the scope of the 
~ Commission's power. It is a function which the Legis-
~ lature under Section 29, Article VI could not, even if 
fl it would, delegate to the Commission. 
Again, thir:; "re-write job" and this release of the 
Company's obligation to the City is an obvious, and ~: 
intolerable interference with the City's "municipal 
~i' 
money, property and effects." The order attempting 
it is beyond the Commission's power, unconstitutional !i 
and void. $: 
~i That there may be no question, we call attention to 
the fact that in the case of 
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Logan City vs. Public Utilities Commission 72 
Utah 536, 271 Pac. 961, 
this Court held that Article VI, Section 29 of the Con-
stitution applies to the Commission here. 
For these reasons also the Order of the Commission 
must be vacated. 
POINT 8. The Order of the Commission by its 
terms and in ef.fect unlawfully transforms a lawful and 
proper franchise fee exacted from the Company into 
an unlawful p1trchase, sales or use tax on the users of 
telephone service, in violation of Article VI, Section 29, 
Article XI, Section 5(a), and Article XIII, Section 5, 
of the Constitution of Utah. 
In considering this point we must first direct the 
Court's attention specifically to the exact provisions of 
the tariff regulation which the Commission's Order ap-
proves. It provides: 
'' 1. Rate schedules of the Telephone Com-
pany in Utah, do not include any portion of any 
sales, excise, franchise or occupation tax, costs 
of furnishing service without charge, or similar 
taxes ... " 
2. Insofar as practical, any such taxes ... 
or charges . . . may be hilled by the Company .to 
its exchange customers on a pro-rata .basis, 
with the amount thereof added to the btU for 
service to the Company's subscribers in the area 
wherein such taxes,'' etc. are levied against the 
Company. (Emphasis supplied). 
What are the Company and the Commission saying¥ 
Clearly and unequivocally they are saying, first, that 
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franchise fees and special taxes against the Company 
are no longer regarded by the Company as an operating 
expense and so inc.luded in the rate structure, even 
on a local basis; and seco11d, that such fees and taxes, 
as such. may be billed to subscribers within the city 
limits. Clearly this is not a rate increase equal to the 
tax or fee, for ''Rate schedules ... do not include any 
portion" thereof, and the amount is "added to the bill 
for sen·ice. '' .Jioreover, some subscribers on the ex-
change, living near to but outside of the corporate 
limits are rated as urban area subscribers at urban 
area rates, but they are not to be billed for the tax, 
because they are not ''subscribers in the area wherein 
such taxes" and fees are levied against the Company. 
The area of increase is limited strictly to the area in 
which the City has territorial jurisdiction for tax pur-
poses. 
Even though in its order approving the tariff regu-
lation the Commission uses some language consistent 
with a rate increase on an exchange basis, it is obvious 
that on such rate increase is in fact contemplated, for 
- at least some exchange customers are not to be included. 
It is the tax which is billed to the customers. This 
-~ is made more than clear by the Commission's reference 
to its case number 3755. (R 34). The Commission says: 
''That case involved a request of Mountain 
Fuel Snpply Company for authority to bill its 
customers directly for certain mwnicipal taxes 
arnd licenses . . . 
In that case we said : 
'If the consumers of gas within the limits 
of cities ... are cognizant of the burdens imposed 
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-- --~ 
upon them by their city officials, such consumers 
will keep those taxes or fees within reasonable 
limits.' " (Emphasis supplied.) 
Notice that the language used does not here refer 
to an increase in rates to compensate for taxes paid 
by the Company, it refers to authority to bill the cus-
tomers for "taxes and licenses." It refers to burdens 
placed by ''city officials.'' 
Even though the Commission in its opinion also 
refers to "increased rates due to such taxes " it is 
' submitted that the quoted "slips of the pen" reflect the 
true purpose and intent of the Commission; namely, to 
force a reform in Municipal tax structures and franchise 
contracts in accord with their own and the Company's 
ideas of ''social and economic justice.'' They do not 
believe that the inhabitants of cities should receive any 
compensation for suffering the special burden of pole 
lines over and cable lines under the streets they have 
developed and paid for to earry vehicular and pedes-
trian travel. They will therefore order the "transfer" 
of the burden of paying that compensation to the in-
habitants who should receive it. The compensation is 
effectively set off and cancelled, and the franchise "re-
formed.'' Even though it is apparent that the bulk 
of the Company's revenue and profits are derived from 
business done within the cities in question, they con-
ceive it to be unjust and discriminatory for the cities 
to levy for public purposes an occupation license tax 
based on the revenues taken by the Company from the 
inhabitants; They will therefore order the tax "passed 
on," and extracted for the second time from the in-
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' 
habitants. This effectin:-ly blocks the levying of any 
license tax on the Company, and the Municipal tax 
structure i~ •' reformed.'' The Commission's policy 
emerges triumphant oYer public policy as fixed by the 
constitution and hnn; of Utah. 
Stripped to its basic essentials and cleared of the 
pretense of "rate fixing", the actual result of the Order 
is that the Company now pays no franchise or occu-
t pation taxes, and the local authorities have lost the 
ability to extract from the Company any compensation 
- for the use of the streets, or to impose on the Company 
~ any license tax for the privilege of earning a guaranteed 
r 6% (or more) within the city limits. 
As a result the amount of the franchise fee will 
1 become a matter of indifference to the Company. It 
:J: has an absolute monopoly, so the overall cost is of 
little concern. In "negotiating" a new franchise their 
-· attitude obviously will be "OK boys, how much~ We 
11 
·· don't pay it, so name your own figure and we will 
!! rake it in for you!'' 
ti 
::;.-
This hardly seems a desirable goal to seek. 
• On the other hand, the order fastens on the con-
1 sum.er in Ogden what is, in all its practical and real-
It istic aspects, a purchase or use tax imposed on the con-
i. sumer of telephone service within the city limits. No 
; matter how one looks at it, that is the effect of the 
t order. 
It cancels 1he franchise tax, and levies in lieu thereof 
~: a city telephone-use or sales tax on city subscrihers. 
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This clearly is in excess of the powers permitted 
by the Constitution to the Legislature or its delegatee 
Commission. 
By Article XIII, Section 5, of the Constitution the 
legislature is forbidden to levy any city, town or other 
municipal tax, but is authorized to vest such power in 
the local authorities. So far it has never seen fit to 
vest the local P.uthorities with power to levy sales, pur-
chase or use taxes on the sale or purchase of any com-
modity or service. The Commission has rushed in 
where the local authorities themselves cannot tax. 
And Article· VI, Section 29, forbids the legislature 
to delegate to the Commission the power to levy any 
taxes-but that has not restrained the Commission from 
the attempt. 
Ogden, as a charter city, derives its power to tax 
directly from Article XI, Section 5 (a) of the Constitu-
tion-hut here also the power granted is the "power 
prescribed by general law,'' and we know of no pro-
vision granting any municipality the right to levy a 
tax of the kind here attempted. 
The crux of this matter, of course, is whether or 
not the additional burden imposed on the City's phone 
subscribers is a tax, or an increase in cost of phone 
service. If it is a charge for phone service, then we 
must concede this point. If it is a tax of any kind, 
then this point 8 is well taken. We submit it is in truth 
and fact a tax. 
We have found only one other case where this 
problem was involved. It is the Washington case of 
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State Y~. Department of Public Service 142 Pac. 
498, 535. 
The court makes no attempt to analyze the practical 
result, but merely declares that 
'' Th9re is no basis for the Argument advanced 
by the cities that the department is seeking to 
exercise the taxing power, or to interfere with 
the exercise of that power by the cities. The 
only question concerns the allocation of the 
moneys paid by respondent to the cities under a 
taxing ordinance or pursuant to franchise pro-
. . '' VlSIOnS ••• 
Nor does it clearly appear from that decision that 
there the Order in question "passed on" the tax as 
tax, as was attempted here, or merely increased ex-
change rates for service in an amount sufficient to 
compensate the telephone company for its cost in mu-
nicipal taxes in that exchange. From the Court's further 
remarks on page 535 of the Pacific Report it would 
__ seem that the latter it true. If so, the case is disting-
uishable on this point. The court says, 
"We are of the opinion that the Department, 
insofar as such taxes are concerned, has the 
power to fix special exchwnge rates . . . which 
will in effect require the rate-payers in each 
community to absorb a sum equal to the amount 
of the tax . . . More than this the department 
cannot do.'' 
~ The case was remanded for further proceedings. It 
> would seem that the court was authorizing a bona fide 
fixing of rates on a local, rather than on a state wide 
~: basis, and presumably the department in its further 
!~ 
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i~> t proceedings would take evidence on all the factors neces-
_;;~ sary to fix fair rates on a. local rather than state-wide 
ilin' basis. The case seems not to be in point either on the 
question of the sufficiency of evidence to prove exist-
ing discrimination, or on the· question of the effect of 
"passing on" the tax as an exercise of tax power by the ~J:r 
Washington Department. 
In the briPfs filed by the parties hereto before the 
Public Service Commission, which have been made part ;;.: 
=:efi of the record and certified to this court, there are only 
three cases cited which deal specifically with the quest-
ion of passing locally imposed franchise charges and 
occupation taxes on to the consumers within the area 
imposing the tax. We have found no other cases di- :;:> 
reetly on this question. The three cases are 
City of Elmhurst vs. Western United Gas Com- :IG'~ 
pany (Ill., 1936) supra 
State vs. Department of Public. Service (Wash., ~:a1' 
r~ 1943) supra 
and 
State of Mo. ex Rel. City of St. Louis vs. Public 
Service Commission of Missouri (Mo., 1952) 
supra. 
The Missouri case is directly with the cities' con· 
tention that the franchise and occupation taxes may 
not be passed on. The Washington case is directly with 
the city as to franchise fees, but as to occupation taxes 
the Washington court allows the same to be passed on 
to the users in the area concerned. The Illinois case 
holds that the local levies there involved should be passed 
on to users in the area imposing the same. 
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The eity does not agree with the Washington court's 
.: reasoning as to occupation taxes for the reasons set 
forth in other parts of the brief. 
But concecling for the purpose of argument that 
--- occupation taxes and related local impositions can be 
:·- lawfully passed on directly to users in the area, as to 
franchise fees or charges the Washington court, on pag·e 
_, 535 et seq. in Volume 1-!~ Pac. 2nd under subdivisions 
43 to 46, incluE"iYe, clearly holds that franchise charges 
. are different from occupation or business taxes and 
-~- franchise charges cannot be passed on to users in the 
- area taxed but must be considered general operating 
~~ expense of the company. 
Counsel fo1 the company, on page 12 of the Com-
pany's brief before the Commission, cites the Wash-
... ington case, supra, and a subsequent case, 
State ex rei Seattle vs. Department of Public 
Utilities 207 Pac. 2d 712 (Wash., 1949). 
He then declares that in these ''cases'' the Washington 
Court sustained an order authorizing the Company to 
-· add ''use of street'' and other city taxes to its charges 
> for municipal service. Counsel then baldly declares that 
"to all intents and purposes there can be no distinction 
_:: between a franchise which grants the use of streets and 
: ~ imposes a tax based upon the Company's gross revenue 
-;..< for such use of streets and a tax imposed for the use of 
~;. streets determined in the same manner. '' 
~"' 
-.-.: It is true that in the latter case the Washington 
:;_. Court sustained an order which authorized the passing 
,.. on of use of street taxes imposed by the cities. How-
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., 
~~I 
ever, it is obvious from a reading of the case that the 
ground for this decision is that the order of the depart-
ment was entered under the direction of a judgment 
entered by the Superior Court upon remittitur in the -~: 
first case, from which Superior Court judgment no 
appeal had been taken. The court holds that under these 
circumstances the judgment of the court below became 
the law of the case and could not be disturbed, even ~-' 
if erroneous, in the appeal taken some six years later -~;IJI. 
in a proceediir..g to review the order of the department 
entered pursuant to the first judgment of the Superior :Ji; 
Court. The Washington Court refers to two earlier 
Washington cases : 
Tucker vs. Brown 
92 Pac. 2nd 221 
and 
Tucker vs. Brown 
150 Pac. 2nd 604, 622, 
and quotes with approval from the latter case as follows: 
''If appellant was not satisfied with the ·· ". 
judgment entered by the trial court upon the 
remittitur, it could have petitioned this court 
to correct that judgment. Having failed to take 
appropriate action, appellant is foreclosed from 
in any way objecting to the judgment.'' 
The W ashiagton court, in the Seattle rate case, then · "· 
:>' 
says (Page 716) : 
''The situation presented in the two cases 
just mentioned, and that obtaining in this and 
the first rate case, are entirely alike. The Brown 
interests in the second case cited, were held to be ~~mi! 
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l bound by the judgment of the Superior Court 
~ entered after the remittitur went down.'' 
~ Although the cities had petitioned for a recall of 
:1 the remittitur in the earlier rate case when the Super-
, ior Court entered its mistaken judgment on remittitur, 
t1 the petition to recall the remittiur was denied. The 
rl court does not say why it was denied, but it would ap-
Mi: pear that probably the cities had mistaken their remedy 
~- and should have made a second appeal from the judg-
!11! ment entered on the remittitur. Perhaps they did not 
~! act in time. However that may be, this case is certainly 
~! not any clear authority for the points on which it IS 
cited. Moreover, in the first Washington rate case, 
State vs. Department of Public Service 
142 Pac. 2nd 498, 533, 
the Washington Court very clearly and carefully dis-
tinguished between payments due under franchise con-
tracts for the use of streets and all other special munici-
iif pal taxes and held that the former could not be passed 
·, on, and there 1 s nothing said by the court in the later 
~~ case which in any way weakens its ruling on that dis-
J ~'. tinction. Counsel's assertion with respect to franchise 
~;: contracts and use of street taxes is contrary to the 
,_: authority on which he relies. 
~ 
The agreement between Ogden City and the Com-
~)2 pany here is clearly a franchise contract, and the first 
Washington case is clear authority, not weakened by 
,, 1 the second cas8, for the city's position that the charges 
-ia~ there agreed to be made cannot be legally passed on, 
,jl but a.s a matte-r:· of law must be paid by the Company as 
~~·:a general operating expense out of its general income. 
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The third case, Elmhurst vs. W es·tern United Gas 
Company is referred to in the first Washington case 
and its reasoning rejected as to franchise payment~ 
but approved as to occupation taxes. As the Wash-
ington court observes, the Elmhurst case is. distinguish-
able from the Washington case (and from the case at 
Bar) because, "It would seem that the case presented 
to the Illinois court did not involve a utility engaged 
in state-wide operations. Jus.t how much territory the 
utility which was a party to that proceeding served 
cannot be determined from the opinion. The situation 
was not entirely comparable to that presented in the 
case at Bar.'' pp. 537 of 142 Pac. 2nd. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Commission ' 
acted illegally, arbitrarily and capriciously, and in ex-
cess of its jurisdiction in entering the Order complained 
of, and that the Order should be vacated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL THATCHER 
First Security Bank Building . 
Ogden, Utah 
JACK A. RICHARDS 
CHARLES H. SNEDDON 
Eccles Building 
Ogden, Utah 
Attorneys for Plailntiff 
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